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This paper analyzes the available evidence of China's S&T, R&D, and 
innovative capabilities, to provide an  assessment of the effectiveness and 
potentialities of its national system of innovation (NSI) ), and to  formulate  some 
preliminary policy suggestions  aimed at improving China's overall innovation 
strategy. Our approach focuses particularly on the evolving relationship between 
China's NSI and the country's overall market socialist social and economic system - 
both of which are developing fast and undergoing deep qualitative changes - and on 
related policy challenges.  
 
China's innovation strategy aims at embodying world-class best practices from 
technological world leaders and successful late industrializers, but is also peculiarly 
Chinese in at least two crucial aspects. The first is China's sheer size, which has 
allowed her to leapfrog to rank 2 worldwide in terms of the absolute quantitative 
magnitude of its NSI, at a stage when it still far lags behind all technological leaders 
in terms of per capita educational, technological, and research  achievements. The 
second is China's specific form of market socialism, which has the potential of 
conferring her leaders an outstanding advantage in the crucial area of strategic 
planning, i.e. the capability to master national resources and to earmark them towards 
key goals accordingly to a clear set of priorities. 
 
China's goal is to engineer in a relative short period a decisive qualitative leap 
in her NSI, developing a systemic ability to generate world-class indigenous 
innovations. In addition to fostering technical progress, China's development strategy 
shall also take into account the challenge of establishing a model of innovation 
compatible with an equitable pattern of income distribution and environmental 
sustainability, thereby paving the way to the eventual evolution towards a higher and 
more developed form of socialism. This is the expressed aim of the Chinese 
leadership. However, the simple NSI approach is not necessarily sensitive to these 
strategic requirements, and therefore there is a need for more advanced analytical and 
planning tools. In this context, we propose to consider the utility of nonlinear models 
of the POLIS (positive feed back loop innovation system) class, which are suitable to 
chart strategically the market socialist course, as their internal logic is consistent with 
China's unique catch up strategy. 
 
 
                                           
1 We are grateful to Francesco Schettino, University of Ancona, Italy. This paper has not been 
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1.   Introduction  
 
The aim of this paper is to provide a BROAD assessment
1 of the effectiveness 
and potentialities of its national system of innovation (NSI), and to formulate some 
preliminary policy suggestions aimed at perfecting China's overall innovation 
strategy. Our approach focuses particularly on the evolving relationship between 
China's NSI and the country's overall market socialist social and economic system - 
both of which are developing fast and undergoing deep qualitative changes - and on 
related policy challenges.  
 
  By the turn of the century
2, China's R&D  sector was growing rapidly in size 
and effectiveness, yet a major reorientation of resources towards research activities 
had not materialized yet
3. Major policy changes had been taking place in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and   China's R&D system was undergoing two main and apparently 
contradictory, but in fact potentially complementary transformation trends. On one 
hand, there was a powerful drive towards commercialization and decentralization. On 
the other hand, the government was earmarking large resources and according an 
increased degree of priority to a new generation of national research programmes. The 
innovative capacity and the technological level of Chinese productive enterprises 
were improving, particularly so in the state-owned sub-sector, where managing 
practices and property relations were undergoing major changes (Gabriele 2002). In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s China has kept investing heavily in its R&D and S&T 
sector, and reforming its NSI. Similar patterns, on a lesser extent, were observed in 
other semi-industrialized developing countries.  
 
In the meantime, further evidence is accumulating on the key role of R&D in 
boosting economic growth (see David et al. (2000), Arora et al (2007)) and on global 
technological trends, which point towards an ever-increasing   divergence between 
developed and developing countries. Only China and (possibly)
4 a very small group 
of other semi-industrialized countries are beginning to close the technological gap 
separating them from the world leaders (see Fagerberg, Knell, and Srholec (2007)). 
However, there are also signs of a sort of "research and innovation fatigue" which 
appears to be emerging in the developed world.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the 
recent contributions stemming from an ever-expanding literature. Section 3 presents 
and comments the most updated statistical indicators on China's S&T and R&D   
inputs and outputs. China's 15-year Science and Technology Plan. Section 4 discusses 
whether China is actually overinvesting and the need to shift towards an increasingly 
intensive and innovation-led form of growth. Section 5 discusses present 
opportunities and challenges Section 6 concludes.   
 
 
2. China's NSI and the linkages between industry and science 
China's NSI has witnessed remarkable advances since the early 1980s, as a 
result of a series of reforms aimed mainly at improving its effectiveness and closing 
the excessive gap which traditionally separated university-based research activities 
from the technology absorption and innovation needs of the enterprises system. The 
main thrust reforms has been to diversify the country's NSI and to strengthen its  3  
market-orientation (or market-compatibility), but the role of centrally-managed large, 
long-term research programs has also been enhanced. These reforms, along with the 
ever-expanding availability of financial resources made possible by economic growth 
and by the strong role of the national state, have allowed achieving remarkable 
advances. As a result, for instance, China's NSI is far superior to that of the other 
Asian emerging giant, India, in virtually every aspect (see Dahman (2007), Schmitz 
and Stamm (2007), Kash, Augur, and Li (2004), Hung (2008)). 
Several organizational and institutional structures which proved their validity 
in the context of developed market economies are also being studied, experimented, 
and in some cases adopted in China, but such a pragmatic approach does not amount 
to an attempt to ape western examples. Actually, "It is far from clear that evolving 
into an innovation system similar to that found in developed market economies is a 
possible or even advisable objective for China or other countries emerging from 
central planning regimes and Soviet-style industrial organization…."   On the 
contrary, "it is necessary to accept the possibility that fundamentally different but 
equally viable national innovation systems could emerge in China, other formerly 
centrally planned economies, or other nations with similarly very different legacies of 
industrial organization and social systems ….Policymakers would then be able to 
better evaluate which system structure is most appropriate, given the particular 
characteristics of their national context and the costs and likelihood of successfully 
introducing changes to move towards an alternative system structure" (Liu and White 
(2001), p.1112). 
The most visible change in China's NSI is probably the progressive shift of the 
bulk of R&D activities away from universities and specialized research centres and 
towards industrial enterprises (see Section 3). However, universities participate too 
many of the most ambitious basic research endeavours, and often play a crucial role in 
their implementation. For instance, universities carry out about 1/3 of the "863 
projects" and   2/3 of the projects founded by National Natural Science Foundation 
(NNSF) (Wu (2007) , Hu and Jefferson 2004). In order to re-balance the roles of the 
different actors in the R&D scene in favour of the academia, the Chinese government 
is earmarking increasing funds to elite universities, mainly through the Ministry of 
Education (MOE). Elite universities are expected to lead in national R&D programs 
and projects, facilitate technology diffusion and spillovers,   promote spin-off 
companies, incubation centres, and open laboratories for  R&D sharing, to bridge-in 
foreign technology and partners. This emphasis on the  role of universities in 
engaging directly in the development, production,  and commercialization stages of 
their research results has been dubbed "forward engineering " by Lee. According to 
this scholar, forward engineering is a peculiarly Chinese component of the "Beijing 
Consensus", a comprehensive and proactive catch-up strategy very different from the 
"Washington Consensus" and partly, but not fully similar to that followed before by 
other successful Asian latecomers such as Korea and Taiwan (see Lee 2006a, b and 
Lee, Hanh, and Justin Yifu 2002). Among other initiatives, a very important one was 
project 211, aimed at funding the construction of campuses and developing new 
academic programs in key scientific areas all over the country (Hsiung 2002) during 
the 1996-2000 5 year plan period. Other programs promote specifically university-
industry links. The first one of this kind was launched jointly in 2001 by the State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and the MOE to set up state technology 
transfer centres in six universities, in order to promote the commercialization of  4  
technological achievements. Another directive issued by MOE in 2002 encouraged 
the development of university start-up enterprises, after a long debate that concluded 
with the official position that universities have a threefold mission: research, teaching, 
and commercialization. Research and technological innovations are seen as crucial 
channels through which universities contribute to national and local economies (see 
Ma 2004, Zhang 2003, (Haiyan,  Yuanlong and Kaiyuan 2006, Hong 2006,. 
Motohashi 2005). 
 
As mentioned above, however, the bulk of China's R&D is presently being 
carried out by enterprises, many of which are large SOEs. These firms have managed 
so far to resist and even to thrive after over a quarter-century of market-oriented 
reform, in the framework of a complex, ever-changing and opaque institutional 
environment,  characterized by a weak and ambiguous -albeit increasing- degree of  
protection of property rights in general and of intellectual property rights (IPR) in 
particular5. Shedding light on this apparent (for orthodox economics)  paradox, most 
studies on innovation among Chinese productive enterprises found that substantial 
progress was going on, and that SOEs were capturing the bulk of  S&T resources, but 
exhibiting a less-than-satisfactory capability of translating them into true production 
improvements. The innovative capability of SOEs, however, appears to have been 
further enhanced in the mid-2000s6, thanks at least partly to the economies of scale 
and scope made possible by the "grasping the big, enlivening the small" policy. The 
combined profit of the 150 or so companies controlled by China's central government 
reached Rmb1,000bn (USD140bn), more than 200% higher than five years earlier. By 
end- 2007, the list of the world’s 10 most valuable companies contained four groups 
controlled by the Chinese state7.  The behaviour of Chinese SOEs is also becoming 
more modern and effective in a number of areas, including their ability to attract top 
executive talents (Dodson (2008)). 
 
In China as elsewhere, R&D expenditure is positive and significantly 
correlated with firm productivity. Government R&D contribution to firm productivity 
works mainly through an indirect channel, via the promotion of  firms' own  R&D, 
which appears to be a more effective policy tool than direct R&D grants. Other key 
sources of production improvement and innovation growth are each firm's absorptive 
capacity, the production network, openness, and managers' education. Market-
oriented, competition-enhancing innovation system reforms are improving the 
effectiveness of the incentive structure and fostered S&T linkage activities.  With 
respect to the impact of ownership type,  SOEs perform worse than collective and 
private firms in terms of production performance, but not in terms of innovation 
capabilities grants (Guangzhou Hu (2001), Guangzhou Hu and  Jefferson (2003), 
Motohashi and Yun (2007)).  The choice of innovation types among Chinese SOEs 
depends on the turbulence in the environment, and on the organizational resources, 
with market forces and internal governance simultaneously influencing SOEs' 
innovation patterns (Li, Liu, and Ren (2007)). In many SOEs, managers apply the 
technical innovation audit tool for benchmarking, thereby improving their ability to 
choose among different types of innovation mechanisms.  
Due to the influence of the two main stakeholders (government and end-
users),  firms with a higher degree of government involvement companies and a 
correspondently lower degree of  openness to the market exhibit a more widespread 
use of innovation mechanisms, thereby apparently contradicting  the positive 
relationship between market focus and innovativeness traditionally posited  by  5  
“Western” innovation management theories. Therefore, "entering an open market 
abruptly may not be the solution for SOEs, which are rooted in a socialist economy, to 
become more competitive and more innovative" (Ren,  Krabbendam, and de Weerd- 
Nederhof (20069.  SOEs tend to prioritize the fulfillment of administrative tasks and 
"empire-building" ventures, whereas non-state firms tend to be more profitable in the 
market (Li and Xia (2008)). With the term "empire-building",  Li and Xia refer to 
SOEs' managers' propensity (which they attribute to "agency problems"), to pursue 
"long-term investment and meeting new product output target, at the cost of high level 
of slack and inefficiencies…"(p.41). SOE's managers are "less concerned with the 
lack of legal protection of property right. Thus, compared with their non-state 
counterpart, they are relatively more likely to invest in projects with a longer payback 
cycle" (p.45). This phenomenon is due largely to strong government interference in 
SOEs' behavior:  in a context of relatively weak IPR protection the government puts a 
paramount emphasis on  long-term investments and makes a great effort to promote 
technological innovation, targeting them as important indicators of SOE performance 
and awarding resources to SOEs accordingly). SOEs, rely more on government-
allocated resources, and therefore tend to perform better in areas that are encouraged 
by the government, such as new product development. As new product output is an 
important indicator of SOE performance, SOEs are incentivated to  operate at the 
frontier of new product development ( Li and Xia (2008) ,MOST, 2005). In our view, 
in spite of the relevance of static inefficiencies and distortions, SOEs' much 
"distorted" behavior implies extremely relevant dynamic advantages in terms of 
innovative capacity and technological progress, with major spillovers benefiting the 
national economy as a whole - taking also into account the existence of virtuous 
synergies with the non state-owned sector.  
 
Notwithstanding China's NSI remarkable strengths, remaining challenges are 
huge. For instance, Wang (2006) identifies a dualistic pattern in China's of 
technological development, with the export-oriented segments of the economy being 
relatively isolated from those producing mainly for the domestic market. Zeng and 
Wang (2007) stress the weight of constraints such as an insufficiently developed 
institutional framework, relatively low overall educational attainments, the lack of a 
large pool of world-class talents, the embryonic stage of indigenous innovation 
capacity, and insufficiently developed linkages between R&D and industrial 
enterprises. Other researchers point towards China's and the persistent weaknesses in 
technological cooperation between universities and industry, the  inadequate 
integration of the country's NSI into the global innovation networks, and the  need to 
develop a comprehensive , more refined  technological strategy is to be developed  to 
achieve effective technology transfer from foreign technological leaders,  while at the 
same time maintaining an appropriate balance  between indigenous innovations and 
technology imports (see Li-Hua (2007),   Haiyan, Yuanlong and Kaiyuan (2006),  Li-
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3   Recent evidence on China's innovative capabilities  
 
3.1.    Indirect and comparative evidence on China's technological progress 
 
Growing quantitative evidence is becoming available on various aspects of 
China's economy, institutions, and innovative capabilities, and they broadly converge 
towards suggesting that China is in fact climbing fast the economic and technological 
development ladder. Figures on economy-wide and industrial GDP, export, and labor 
productivity growth are too well known to be worth mentioning here. S&T, R&D and 
high-tech trade indicators are discussed in Section 3.2. Various other sources mention 
statistics bearing indirect relevance to gauge China's technological power. Fortune's 
2007 list of the top 500 global corporations includes 24 Chinese firms, four more than 
in the previous year.  This figure is still far from that of US global companies (162), 
and also quite lower than Japanese, French, and German companies, but it's higher 
than the number of Korean, Indian and Taiwanese companies (Yoshida 2007). 
 
Intriguing comparative evidence  on companies' productivity growth and 
propensity to innovate appear to show that Chinese firms are doing pretty well, 
European firms are  maintaining their positions and ( surprisingly) US  firms are 
losing ground (see Suh 2008).  Productivity growth in China is more than three times 
the rate of that in the US and Europe. A survey carried out on more than 500 chief 
information officers (CIOs) in the US, Europe, and China provides even more striking 
results. Only 32 % of US executives and 41% of Europeans said they wanted to be 
early adopters of new technologies, compared to 70% of Chinese CIOs (Mayberry, 
Wang, and Suh 2006. see also Accenture 2007, 2008). Consistently, 70% of 
companies in China are committing most of their business to web services, against 
42% in Europe and 38% in the US:  "As companies use these new standards for 
communicating with other systems, people and companies, they cut manual business 
process costs to one-10th of current levels and can flexibly change features and 
services in less time for substantially less money….. Newer systems, during this 
second wave of web-based innovations, outperform older technology. These 
technologies have improved substantially in the past five years, making them easier to 
implement. As a result, more business processes will be online, driving higher levels 
of productivity" (Suh 2008). Moreover, many indicators on productivity, revenue and 
profit growth show that US companies are doing significantly worse than what 
conventional data on productivity growth might suggest. Among US S&P 500 large 
companies, employee growth was faster than both revenue and profit growth in 2001-
2005. Thus, the growth of average revenue gains per employee was 58% lower than 
total average revenue growth, and profits per employee growth were only 75% of total 
profit growth. In contrast, among US S&P 350 companies recorded revenue and profit 
growth rates higher than employee growth rates.
8  
Further indirect evidence of major advances in the areas of governance, 
management, and technology in China's industry is provided by the very marked 
improvements in SOEs' economic and financial performance. In the aftermath of the 
1997 Asian financial crisis China's SOEs sector, long plagued by the traditional 
deficiencies common to most publicly-owned productive enterprises, saw its average 
profit margins fall close to zero, with many firms reporting big losses. The prevailing 
wisdom, even among many Chinese observers, was that "since good performance 
does not guarantee that the incumbent manager will stay long, the manager does not  7  
have long-term incentives…. these built-in problems of state ownership cannot be 
solved by state-dominated corporatization…To ensure that only high ability people 
will be professional managers and that managers can be well disciplined, the authority 
of selecting management must be transferred from bureaucrats to capitalists. This 
calls for privatization of both state enterprises and state banks "(Zhang 1998). 
After ten years of restructuring, which implied a dramatic decrease in 
employment and in enterprise numbers but also massive injections of capital and 
technology and a major leap in managers' and workers' education and skills, the SOEs 
sector is in good financial health. In 2007, the profits of the core 152  firms controlled 
by the central government was about Rmb  1000 bn (USD 140 bn),  more than 30% 
higher than in 2006 and over 200% higher than five years earlier. The rate of return 
was 11.7%, 1.3% higher than in 2006. 139 enterprises ( more than 90 percent of core 
SOEs) increased their profits year-on-year… period, and 18 of them recorded profits 
of more than 10 billion yuan, against 14 a year earlier" (Chinaview 2007). 
Shipbuilding, automotive and shipping enterprises are becoming significant profit 
earners, along with petroleum, power generation and telecom companies.  
 
In this respect, there is a sub-sector that of cellular phones, where Chinese 
enterprises might soon achieve global leadership, thanks inter alia to their unique 
technological change pattern. Domestic producers' competitiveness in the world's 
largest cell phone market has been buoyed by the Chinese government's October 2007 
decision to eliminate all licensing requirements to manufacture and sell mobile 
phones in the country, thereby opening the gate for newcomers, some of which have 
been selling phones in the black market. Differently from Japan, which has been quite 
innovative in the past but mainly produced models sold only in the local market, 
China is presently using the same technologies as the rest of the world. This important 
difference could induce Chinese manufacturers to launch fast-forward innovations 
with the goal of increasing their domestic market share, thereby ending up producing 
phones that result ex post competitive also in foreign markets. New Chinese brands 
are making progress in the areas of brand name, research and marketing development, 
and appear on the way to close the gap with foreign brands. They might be 
particularly successful in the huge and fast-growing rural market, Rural customers are 
price-sensitive than in the cities and "do not have strong brand loyalty, so they buy 
things which can give them the best value. To cater to such values, home-grown 
brands pack more features into their phones, making people think they can get more 
value from these products…Among the new entrants of home-grown handset vendors, 
Beijing-based Tianyu is a rising star. It expects to sell 13 million mobile phone units 
in 2007, a 113.1% growth year-on-year to become the third biggest domestic handset 
vendor in China. …" (Chung  2007). Other strong and innovative firms are CECT 
(which has launched a model with biometric security features) and Meizu. These 
companies "seem to be building up a global customer base attracted by the feature 
sets of the phones, which aren’t provided by the global brands…. It’s also pretty 
inevitable that there will a breakthrough product, one that just happens to meet an 
unexpected demand, and that will really bring Chinese phones to global 
attention"(Trigram.wordpress.com 2007).  
 
   In sum, China is trying to create a group of larges leading SOEs in highly 
competitive sectors, where technology, design and marketing capabilities are key for 
ultimate survival, thereby overcoming a traditional weakness of public enterprises  8  
worldwide (Dyer and McGregor (2008). The ultimate outcome of this major 
upgrading and restructuring exercise in China's public industry will clearly play a 
crucial role in shaping the country's development model.  
 
3. 2.  R&D and S&T indicators  
 
.  Input indicators show that China not only earmarked huge and ever-increasing 
resources towards research, science, and technology, but also intensified its efforts in 
relative terms, thereby exposing a strong and effective pro- R&D and S&T bias in 
both government and business sector policies (See Table 1). Gross Domestic 
Expenditure on R&D in nominal terms almost tripled (in nominal terms) in the early 
2000s, reaching 300 bn yuan by 2006. In a period of very fast economic growth, the 
GERD/GDP percentage ratio also increased markedly, from .95 in 2001 to 1.42 in 
2006. This figure is beginning to approach the 2% benchmark which is commonly 
considered a rule-of-thumb indicator signaling that "a country is sufficiently 
technologically sophisticated to help ensure technology-led economic growth." 
(OECD 2007). The business sector is the main contributor to total R&D expenditure 
(almost 70% in 2006), with most of the remainder being provided by the government. 
Sector-wise, over 70% of China's R&D is carried out by the business sector, which 
also employs almost 2/3 of the country's R&D personnel and about 19% by research 
institutes.  70% of China's R&D workforce focuses on experimental development, 
20% on applied research and almost 10% on basic research (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2).  
Roughly a half of total R&D is concentrated in the manufacturing industry, 
representing about 2% of its total value added. However, the latter indicator is more 
than twice as much in the high-tech industries, and reaches almost 14% in the aircraft 
and spacecraft sub-sector (see Table 1.3). Government S&T appropriation reached 
168.8 bn yuan in 2006, more than twice the correspondent figure for 2001. 
Government S&T appropriation also increased as a percentage of total government 
expenditure (3.7 in 2001 to 4.2 in 2006), with a high level of priority being accorded 
to special projects and operating funds.  S&T personnel reached over 4 million, and 
R&D personnel (mostly scientists and engineers) 1.5 million (see Table 1.4).  
 
.  Patents granted by SIPO (State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s 
Republic of China) in 2006 were over 280000, more than twice the corresponding 
figure for 2002 and six times that of 1996.  Over 22000 patents were granted to 
Chinese nationals (up from about 17000 in 2005) and 44000 to foreigners. However, 
most domestic patents were granted for utility model and design innovations. In the 
subset classified as true "inventions", successful foreigner applicants outnumbered 
Chinese nationals, although the share of invention patents granted to the latter (43%) 
increased from that of the previous year (39%). Over half of all domestic service 
invention patents were generated in the business sector (see table 2.1). China's 
published over 400 thousand S&T papers in 2006, almost twice as much as in 2001. 
More than half were produced by universities, but the fastest rate of increase was 
recorded by publications stemming from medical institutions. Chinese S%T papers 
indexed by SCI, EI, and ISP were 172 thousand in 2006, two-thirds more than in 
2001. The share of Chinese S%T papers indexed by the main international specialized 
institutions also rose significantly, reaching more than 42% by 2006.  
 
.  China's high-tech trade expanded at an extremely fast pace. Exports increased 
twenty-fold in 1996-2006 period, reaching 2.8 USD bn by the end of the period. Their  9  
relative weight also rose, and by 2006 it had climbed to about 30%, both with respect 
to manufacturing exports and to total exports
9. High-tech imports increased at a 
slightly slower pace, and as a result the high-tech trade balance turned positive in 
2006 for the first time (see Table 3.1.).  China's high-tech trade is heavily 
concentrated on the computers & telecom sub-sector, with over 2.2 bn exports and a 
1.5 bn surplus in 2006.  
 
  Available, simple international comparative indicators of R&D inputs and 
outputs confirm the basic features of an overall scenario in which China has 
undoubtedly joined the worldwide Ivy League, pouring towards the research sectors 
enormous and ever-increasing human and financial resources, far outpacing other 
large, semi-industrialized countries such as Brazil and India, and leapfrogging far 
ahead of many countries formerly seen as among the most industrialized ones, such as 
Italy. However, they also show that China still lags behind the US and the other 
members of the small group of world technological leaders in the most advanced 
areas.  
In dollar terms, China's Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D appears to be 
only slightly over one tenth of that of the US, one fifth of that of Japan, and half that 
of Germany (still, it is over four times higher than Russia's and Brazil's). However, in 
this case the MOST data, albeit formally correct, are misleading, as they might induce 
to unduly underestimate China's true strength vis a vis the rest of the world:" While 
the dollar figure on China’s R&D spending is dwarfed by that of Japan and the U.S., 
the real value of its expenditure is higher, thanks to lower costs – putting China third 
globally, on the basis of purchasing power parity" (HIKPA 2006). In fact, the 
international R&D expenditure figures expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP)
10 
estimated by the OECD terms show a dramatically different picture. Having been 
growing at an exceptionally high annual rate of over 20% (more than five times that 
of any other major industrial country), China's R&D expenditure reached 136 bn USD 
in 2006, the second largest in the world, surpassing that of Japan 
11 and  equivalent to 
more than one third that of the US (see Table 4.2). 
 
In terms of   R&D intensity of the national economy, measured by the 
GERD/GDP percentage ratio, China has clearly left behind Italy, Russia, Brazil, and 
India, but still lags behind the four world R&D leaders:  US, Germany, Japan, and 
Korea. The two Asian countries, in particular, lead the field in terms of R&D intensity   
with GERD/GDP ratios close to or larger than 3%, more than twice China's ratio. 
Data on the distribution of GERD resources confirm the findings reported in paras 1 
and 2 above, i.e. that China's R&D activity - consistently with its present level of 
technological development - is much less focused on basic research than that of any 
other major player, including Russia.  The absolute size of China's  R&D personnel 
army (over 1.5 mn) far outnumbers that of any other country, yet in relative terms 
(R&D personnel per 10,000 labor force) it is less than one tenth that of Japan, 
Germany, and even Russia (see Table 4.1.). 
 
Basic comparative indicators of international R&D outputs appear
12 to show 
that China - having reduced rapidly its relative backwardness, especially in the early 
2000s - figures among the global leaders, as it ranks 4
th worldwide in terms of 
domestic invention patents granted, 2
nd in terms of indexed papers published, and 5
th 
in terms of SCI-indexed papers published. Table 4 data, however, are not adequate to 
provide firm evidence on a much-discussed issue, i.e. whether China's ability to  10 
translate R&D inputs into output is structurally lower than that of world technological 
leaders.  
 
4.   Accumulation and technical progress 
 
Felipe et al. (2008) apply a Classical analytical framework to analyze in a 
comparative fashion the diverging patterns of capital accumulation, profit rates, 
investment rates, capital productivity, and technological change of China and India 
between 1980 and 2003. Their findings can be propedeutic to a deeper discussion on 
the relationship between China's pattern of economic development and its unique 
socioeconomic structure.   
 
China's accumulation process  has been much faster than India's, thanks  to 
China's investment rate (i.e., investment/GDP ratio), due in turn mainly to the fact that 
China has been reinvesting almost all her surplus, while India invested a much lower 
share.. In fact, as a World Bank study has recently pointed out, corporate sector 
saving – including by SOEs – is a key contributor to China's high rates of saving and 
investment: "At about 20 percent of GDP – double the share in the U.S. and France – 
retained earnings finance more than one-half of enterprise investment." (Kuijs, Mako, 
and Zhang 2005, p.3). Another important, and apparently contradictory finding, is that 
profitability has been rising constantly in India, but declining in China, so that the 
profit rate was much higher in the latter by the late-1990s. More worryingly, capital 
productivity
13  declined in China, while it rose in India
14, and - consistently - technical 
change was Marx-biased (i.e. of the labor saving, capital consuming type) in China, 
while it was broadly Hicks-neutral in India. 
 
In sum," India differs from China in terms of how much profit has been 
plowed back into investment. In China virtually all profits are reinvested, with the 
consequence that actual investment has outstripped the capacity provided by profit 
and has led to the creation of overinvestment and overcapacity. Why is so much profit 
reinvested in China? A large part of these profits come form State Owned Enterprises. 
These companies do not pay dividends and face incentives that are biased toward 
investment, as local officials are promoted largely on their success in generating 
economic growth, which comes through investment. Thus, a large part of these profits 
is used for capital expansion (as much as 20% of all investment in China comes from 
local governments) without efficiency considerations…"  (p.752).  
The policy - initiated in 1994 - of non-payment of dividends was initially 
justified by the feeble and declining profitability of public enterprises, and by the need 
to recapitalize SOEs in the framework of a deep reform process aimed at streamlining 
and strengthening state industry, but by the mid-2000s it had been made obsolete by 
its own success. Actually, "The current non-payment of dividends implicitly assumes 
that there is no better use of SOE profits other than re-investment back into SOEs.  
Clearly, however, China faces urgent challenges in refocusing its public spending to 
improve key services.  " (Kuijs ,  Mako  and Zhang, 2005, p.7)
15. It is also clear that, 
as a result of this policy, SOEs have been investing more than they would have had 
otherwise. The Chinese government has acknowledged this problem
16, and began in 
2008 to enact a cautious and still experimental policy change, collecting a modest (5-
10%) share of   the profits of state firms under its direct control. The destination of 
these dividends has not been clearly specified yet, but they are expected to be  11 
channelled to both social consumption (i.e., financing social security funds) and 
investment in high technology sectors (see China Daily 2007, China.org.cn  2007, 
Shanghai daily 2007, Naughton 2008). This development surely goes in the right 
direction, but is still probably insufficient even to achieve the simple goal to curb 
excessive investment (see Chan 2007). 
  Felipe et al 2008 attribute their findings largely to India's unfavourable 
institutional investment climate, and to China's bureaucratic push towards wasteful 
and inefficient investment. SOEs' bias towards wanton and inefficient expansion of 
investment, in particular, appears to constitute a major weakness of China's economic 
system. In our view, however, it also important to see this issue in another 
perspective. Following Gabriele and Schettino 2008, we introduce the term 
"socialistic". Assume, as a mental experiment, a theoretical continuum  of conceivable  
mixed socioeconomic systems, where on one hand there is a pure free-market, 
private-property based model of classical capitalism, and on the other hand a fully 
publicly-owned, centrally-planned socialist model. In this theoretical framework, the 
term "socialistic" indicates the property of being characterized by crucial systemic 
features in the domain of ownership, class, and other social relations of production 
and exchange which are relevant enough to position a specific socioeconomic 
formation rather strongly towards the socialist side.
17  
  Our reasoning is crucially based on a proposition which we consider a 
relatively self-evident stylized fact, but which by its very nature cannot be 
demonstrated formally. The important differences in the patterns of accumulation and 
technical change found in the two Asian giants are in turn the product of another key 
difference, which is stemming from the very structural nature of their respective 
socioeconomic formations. Simply put, in India, but not in China, there is a full-
fledged capitalist bourgeoisie structured and organized as the dominant class
18 (see, 
for instance, Tsai 2008). Thus, China can be considered as one of the two presently-
existing members
19 of a very small club that of a market-socialist or "socialistic"
20 
countries. India, conversely, is a "normal" capitalistic country.  
A very important corollary of this crucial systemic difference is that the share 
of surplus which finances the bourgeoisie's conspicuous consumption in "normal" 
capitalistic countries is virtually non-existing (or more precisely, carries a much lesser 
macroeconomic and strategic
21 weight) in China, and almost all the profits are 
reinvested.  
In a capitalistic economy, the shadow price of potentially investible financial 
resources in the framework of a long-term social welfare function to be maximized by 
policy- makers is likely to be lower than private capitalists' implicit discount rate. 
Therefore, taking for given the wage rate and hence workers' consumption
22, there 
would be room left for other investment projects, which would imply a relatively low 
but still positive rate of profit .Thus, it is usually the case under "normal"
23 
circumstances that the actual share of invested surplus in a capitalistic economy is 
lower than the one which would be optimal from a long-term social welfare 
viewpoint
24 (See Appendix). 
 What happens, conversely, in an economy that is "socialistic", even if only in 
a weak sense, such as China, where the state is strong enough to effectively command  12 
(via direct appropriation and/or via institutional, administrative, legal, and informal 
mechanisms) the allocation of a major share of the surplus?  Ceteris paribus, a country 
with such "socialistic" characteristics should invest a share of the surplus higher than 
that of a capitalist country. It is reasonable to argue that this is in fact the case in 
China - largely because  a large share of total profits  is earned by SOEs
25, which are 
mandated by the state to  pursue a number of objectives different from profit 
maximization, among them investment expansion.   
According to our view, therefore, a socialistic society can exhibit a lower 
marginal productivity
26 of investment than an otherwise similar capitalist one, and 
still exhibit an overall superior behaviour with respect to the determination of both the 
quantity and the quality of national investment.
27 Whether this is in fact the case or 
not depends on the specific characteristics of the institutional framework shaping 
investment decision in a concrete socialistic economy, and can only be analyzed 
empirically on the basis of available data. Going back to the China-India comparison, 
it is known that the share of surplus that is plowed back to investment (which could 
also be called the investment/surplus ratio) is higher in China than in India. How 
much of China's  additional (with respect to those which would be channelled   
towards capital accumulation in India, or another "normal" capitalist country
28) 
investment resources are rightly earmarked towards socially profitable projects  - 
resulting in a lower marginal and average productivity of investment, but in a better 
long-term allocation of resources - and how much are totally or partially wasted (see 
Appendix)? 
A related but different question is as follows.  The recent decision to let SOEs 
start paying a significant (even if still very small) share of their profits as dividend to 
the state is to be welcome. The destination of these dividends is still not very clearly 
defined, as there would be good economic and social reason both to earmark them to 
social consumption and investment (i.e. public health care and education), but also to 
keep prioritizing investment in infrastructure, key high-tech sectors, and R&D. Given 
the suboptimal state of China's basic public services, and the very long-term 
unsustainability of an already very high and permanently rising investment rate, it is 
plain that a high degree of the priority in the short term should be accorded to enhance 
social public consumption and investment.  In the long term, however, assuming a 
stable and sustainable rate of accumulation is achieved, a more complex issue arises. 
For any modern socioeconomic formation, it is clear that the only way out of 
Marxian's law of declining profit rates is not to slow down accumulation per se, but to 
shift progressively more and more resources towards the development of high-tech 
sectors and towards R&D and S&T activities in particular, striving to accelerate the 
rate of technical progress and to improve its nature. Actually, the pattern of technical 
progress should be made less and less Marx-biased, capital consuming in nature, and 
become increasingly Hicks-neutral, or even capital-saving. Such a major drive 
towards the quantitative and qualitative improvement of technical change patterns 
must be pursued, at least in part, independently from a key price-based signal such as 
the expected market-measured profitability of individual investment projects, in a 
market-compatible framework based on a modern and advanced form of planning. We 
refer to a form of resources allocation where a significant share of aggregate 
investment is allocated according to shadow prices based on a long term planning 
framework. This framework should internalize to the maximum possible extent those 
needs and externalities which do not stem from the price structure emerging  13 
spontaneously from the market - i.e. the "real" long-term social value of education, 
health, the environment, R&D itself, etc. An important component of this overall 
planning framework might be an embodied mechanism to shape in a dynamically 
optimal fashion the evolution of the price structure itself.
29  
 
5.   Opportunities and Challenges: from NSI to POLIS? 
 
Since the late 1990s,  the Chinese Government has approved a number of 
crucial strategic decisions to build up  a world-class National Innovation System, seen 
as  " a networking system composed of institutions involved in knowledge innovation 
and technology innovation (which)… includes the following: knowledge innovation 
system netted with the state research institutions and key universities; technology 
innovation and technology application system with industrial enterprises; knowledge 
dissemination system with schools and universities. In 1998 the government   
instructed the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) - a vast network of research 
institutes that are presently undergoing feverish expansion and reorganization - to 
initiate the Pilot Project of Knowledge Innovation Program (KIP)" (CAS 2008). An 
action plan was carried out for rejuvenating education in the 21st century, in addition 
to a national meeting on technology innovation and a working conference on basic 
science research, in order to further enhance the reform of the scientific research 
system. Plans are also drawn to open a second-board  stock exchange in the securities 
market, similar to the American Nasdaq. The KIP piloted at CAS is a major 
component of the National Innovation System (see CAS 2008). 
 
  In January 2006 China launched the “National Medium- and Long-Term 
Program for Scientific and Technological Development” (2006-2020), commonly 
known as the 15-year Plan for science and technology. The Plan's long-term goal is to 
allow China to become a pre-eminent global economic and technological power, 
relying on "independent, indigenous innovation":
30  “By the end of 2020, we should 
establish an improved scientific and technological innovation system. . . We will 
strive to leapfrog the development of China’s information science and technology and 
to acquire core technologies with proprietary intellectual property rights in the IT 
sector.”(quoted in AeA 2007).  
 
Not all the details of the plan were made public, but its main tenets are clear.  
China is foreseen  to raise R&D spending from the current 1.4 percent of its economic 
output to 2 percent by 2010 and 2.5 percent by 2020:"these commitments would put 
Chinese R&D investments above $100 billion annually, placing it in the same league 
as Japan and the United States (RTM 2007).  Acknowledging that China's high-tech 
industry is growing fast but is still largely dominated by multinational companies and 
centred  on low-value-added, labor-intensive manufacturing, "the 15 Year Plan 
intends to change that equation by investing heavily in such cutting-edge areas as 
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Table 5   The 15-year Plan's 12 priority sectors 
 
 Advanced Storage Technologies 
 Alternative and Renewable Energies 
 Biotechnology/Genetics 
 Electronic Components 
 Environmental Technologies 
 Integrated Circuits/Semiconductors 
 Manned Space Exploration 
 Materials Technology 
 Nanotechnology 
 Network and Communication Technologies 
 Optical and Biological Computing 
 Software and Related Services 
 
 
Source: AeA 2007 
 
According to American Electronics Association (AeA), which carried out a 
synthetic assessment of the plan in 2007, (AeA 2007), the Plan's goals are ambitious, 
but not unrealistic
31. China has a leadership mainly composed by engineers, who are 
in a favourable position to understand the nature and the strategic centrality of 
research and technology, and has already built up has remarkable elements of strength 
in the S&T and R&D area. For instance, it has being pouring huge  societal 
investments into higher education and research (state financing for higher education 
more than doubled in  1998-2003, reaching over USD10bn by the end of that period; 
China's number of researchers  increased by almost 80% in 1995-2004, and is now 
second only to the US). Large  SOEs are also investing heavily in technological 
upgrading and human capital formation, and there a number of start-up  innovative 
firms, some of them already established in international markets (such as Lenovo, 
Haier, and Huawei), and others active in crucial areas such as the provision of Internet 
services for the domestic market.  
 
Yet, China also faces a number of challenges. Its high-tech industries are 
growing extremely fast, but at they are mostly owned by foreign TNCs and still 
usually concentrated on low value-added stages in the value chain. In this respect, 
AeA 2007 quotes Daniel Rosen, a senior researcher in the Institute for International 
Economics, who half-jokingly remarked: “China’s high-tech exports turn out not to be 
so very high tech - nor, indeed, very Chinese.”  Another key area of concern is 
constituted by   weak IPRs protection - although the AeA rightly notes that the Plan 
acknowledges that China's own development interests are already shifting in favour of 
strengthening the IPR protection regime, and calls for action in this domain.  
 
AeA 2007 argues that it is also urgent to take decisive measures to reform 
capital markets, encourage risk taking, and let ideas flow more freely, to stimulate 
truly innovative thinking and research. To our view, many of these challenges are in 
fact crucial - a significant exception being, probably, capital market reforms. 
However, it is not straightforward that the remedies should always go in the direction 
of following the US model (as AeA appears to suggest), taking into account the strong 
arguments in favour of fostering a smooth reform path towards a specifically Chinese  15 
NSI consistent with the country's history and its market-socialist socioeconomic 
system (see, for instance Liu and White (2001), Keun Lee (2006)).  
 
Finally, it is important to locate China's 15-year S&T Plan in the framework of 
the worldwide scenario shaped by the converging trends of key frontier technologies. 
As the APEC (2005) workshop on this topic has made clear, the convergence of 
information technology, biotechnology and nanotechnology (the so-called 
superconvergence) might be the most significant technological event of the 21
st 
century (see khan 2005). The process of convergence is already underway. All the 
major national and regional players including USA, EU and Japan have already taken 
significant steps in order to maintain and gain further advantage in these technologies. 
China is a latecomer.  
 
What can China do in order to be in the same league as the three major players 
mentioned above?   Taking into account the challenges posed by a very competitive 
international environment where the other major players still hold a significant 
advantage, China can achieve superconvergence only through the creation of  a self-
sustaining innovation system that can move forward over time,  This paramount   
strategic  goal must be properly seen as the logical evolution of the present S&T  
strategy, basically centered around the perfectioning of China's NSI, towards a 
qualitatively superior, self-propelling  innovation system. The 15-year Plan, if 
successful, will complete the catch up process by 2020. Between 2020 and 2050, the 
strategic goal will become should be to build up autonomously advanced 
technological capabilities in the three crucial areas, with a view towards moving 
towards superconvergence. Regional cooperation with Japan, Korea and Taiwan can 
play an important role in this strategy. Ultimately, a Pan-Asian regional innovation 
network including India and the ASEAN countries might also be established. China's 
National Development and Reform Commission (NRDC) can start the process of 
national capacity building and regional cooperation by supporting key strategic 
ventures. Increasing the number of competent staff in the areas of planning for high 
technology development should be given serious consideration. In Khan (2008a, c, 
2004a, 2002, 1998) the overall planning framework is presented as part of a system-
wide effort to create a positive feedback loop for innovation, which is at the same 
time distributionally progressive, equitable, and environmentally sustainable. The 
term used by Khan to refer to such a mechanism is that of nonlinear positive feed 
back innovation system, or POLIS. (see Appendix 2). The POLIS framework can be 
applied through quantitative economy-wide modeling techniques, in order to analyze 
the challenges for transition from now to 2020 and then from 2020 to 2050. 
 
The POLIS approach is based on a somewhat novel theory of innovation in the 
economy wide setting. Its first and most important feature is that the analysis of a 
POLIS can be thought of as part of the institutional turn in economic theory. 
However, in contrast with much institutional literature, its propositions can also be 
expressed in a formal language, through models that can be estimated quantitatively 
for both rigorous, empirical scientific testing and for policy making purposes. The 
starting point of the POLIS theory is the creative destruction process at the firm and 
industry level. However, an extension to an economy-wide setting requires the 
explicit theorization of the role of the state as well as an interacting nonlinear market 
process. The direction in which the theory leads is a complex interaction between 
state policies and market processes that influence the decisions taken by specific firms  16 
in particular areas of innovative activities.  The key concept that is developed in this 
context can be called a Managed Creative Destruction (MCD) process. In a national 
(or regional) MCD, the creative destruction process characterizing innovation is 
structured more consciously by the state (or the states in a particular region). It can be 
argued that China is now going through this process. Following Schumpeter, we 
assume that innovation in specific firms can have economy-wide effects. As models 
based on this approach have multiple equilibria, the concept of a positive feedback 
loop innovation system or POLIS is formalized by picking an appropriate sequence of 
equilibria over time. It can be also shown that POLIS has empirical relevance by 
applying the formal model to an actual economy.  Ultimately technological 
transformation — in particular the creation of a positive feedback loop innovation 
system - is what makes the difference between sustained growth and gradual or 
sudden decline.  
 
In addition to the system wide approach to innovation over time, the POLIS 
theory offers two other distinct advantages. One is the linkage between micro and 
meso or macro levels. One can start with firm level data on innovation activities and 
link these to sectoral and intersectoral information flows. In this way, what happens at 
the firm level can be seen from a larger, economy wide perspective. At the same time, 
the impact of firm level activities on overall level and pace of innovation can also be 
ascertained qualitatively and quantitatively. 
   
The third aspect of POLIS is distributional. Since the complex system 
dynamics of POLIS is holistic, it integrates production with distribution. Thus the 
distribution of value added in production at both the factorial and household levels 
can be formulated as part of a general equilibrium (or, under circumstances of internal 
or external shocks, disequilibrium) frame work. Given the levels and distribution of 
income among households, the consumption patterns and effective demand feedback 
mechanisms complete the formulation of a system wide model. 
 
 
6  Conclusions 
 
While acknowledging the impressive progress achieved so far, a 
comprehensive recent OECD on China's innovation system (OECD 2007) concluded 
with a sobering warning: "China needs a better return on its fast-rising investments in 
research and development (R&D) and higher education if it is to meet its goal of 
becoming an 'innovation-oriented' economy by 2020…China still has a long way to 
go to build a modern, high-performance national innovation system.".  
 
This statement is realistic, as it stresses the uncertainties on the future without 
underestimating Chinese government's firm strategic determination to achieve the 15-
year Plan's goals. China's leadership is fully aware of the centrality of science and 
technology, not only for economic growth, but also with respect to other crucial 
challenges, such as the ultimate environmental sustainability of its market socialist 
development model
32 and for the sake of enhancing China's relative place among the 
world leading nations.  Consistently, it has being earmarking towards research and the 
broader S&T sector an increasing share of China's fast-growing GDP. Therefore, 
China has now achieved a substantial critical mass in the area of research and 
innovation, second only (according to some estimates) to that of the US, and growing  17 
four times faster than of any of the major world technological leaders, among which 
there are signs that the enthusiasm for ever-increasing investment in R&D might be 
someway declining, both in the public and the private sectors. There is by now plenty 
of  evidence showing that the over the last decade China has witnessed major 
efficiency-enhancing institutional and organizational changes, including in the area of 
property rights, a massive accumulation of human capital, and a very sustained rate of  
scientific and technical progress. Labor productivity has been rising fast, and a major 
part of the improvement is likely to be due to the aforementioned factors, even taking 
into account China's   extraordinary rate of non-human capital accumulation. All 
R&D input indicators have being rising fast, and so did output indicators, such as 
patents and scientific papers. Yet, a closer look shows that China is doing an excellent 
job at absorbing, adapting and developing existing technologies, but is still lagging 
significantly  behind world technological leaders in terms of capability to generate 
state-of-the-art, world-class innovation proper, as  is shown for instance by data on  
basic research and  inventions patents
33. 
 
With respect to state industry, the assessment of available evidence on SOEs' 
performance is more complex. Most sources indicate that, until the end of the past 
century,  SOEs have been were absorbing a major share of investment funds while 
exhibiting efficiency and profitability levels lower than enterprises belonging to other 
forms of ownership. Yet, their propensity to innovate (not always in an effective way) 
was high, and their productivity climbed dramatically, especially during the late 
1990s. Latest available evidence appears to show that, during the present decade, the 
policy of concentrating huge resources on a small number of large and advanced 
SOEs, while letting  smaller and less efficient state enterprises to fence more or less 
on their own ( recurring increasingly to extreme measures such as closures or 
ownership changes) has begun to bring  significant qualitative fruit, as testified by 
core SOEs' increasing profitability and international competitiveness and by the 
embryonic emergence of some world-class state-owned TNCs. Both SOEs and large 
industrial enterprises operating in China under different forms of ownership - such as 
joint ventures and private (national and foreign) firms - manifest a very strong 
willingness to innovate, at a time when their counterparts in the US and - to a lesser 
extent - other OECD countries appear to show a sort of  innovation fatigue. 
 
The economic sustainability of China's historically unprecedented S&T effort 
does not presently appear an issue, at least in the short-to-medium term, taking into 
account the leadership's determination in prioritizing the S&T sector and the 
resilience of China's GDP growth rates, even in presence of diverse unfavorable 
exogenous phenomena such as the Sichuan earthquake and the overall slowdown in 
the international economy triggered by the US subprime crisis. 
 
As a result, China's NSI is undergoing major quantitative and qualitative 
changes. The latter are those which bear the most crucial weight.  The main features 
of the 15-year plan appear to show that the basic tenets of the two-pronged S&T 
strategy outlined in Gabriele (1992) still hold. On one hand, the relationship between 
most R&D activities and the market is becoming closer and closer. Most of the R&D 
is already being carried out inside the enterprise sector, while universities and 
research institutes are intensifying their contacts with firms, and generating 
themselves start-up   ventures to develop, produce and commercialize their 
innovations. The IPR protection system, in particular, is evolving towards  a higher  18 
level of protection, partly to respect China's WTO obligations, but mainly to suit the 
present development stage, characterized by an increasing degree of   
commercialization of the bulk of technological knowledge ( essentially, the one 
stemming from applied research and development activities). On the other hand, in 
order to tackle the crucial weaknesses mentioned above, vast financial, human and 
institutional resources are being channeled towards a long-term basic research 
endeavor, concentrating on a limited number of strategic high-tech sectors. This major 
effort is articulated institutionally in a decentralized fashion, yet operates in a broadly 
consistent organizational and financial framework set up as a key component of 
China's specific form of strategic development planning. 
 
 The challenge, at the present stage, is to engineer in a relative short period 
(10-15 years) a decisive qualitative leap in China's NSI, developing a systemic ability 
to generate world-class indigenous innovations. In addition to generating technical 
progress, China's development strategy shall also take into account the challenge of 
establishing a model of innovation compatible with an equitable pattern of income 
distribution and environmental sustainability, thereby paving the way to the eventual 
evolution towards a higher and more developed form of socialism. This is the 
expressed aim of the Chinese leadership. However, the simple NSI approach is not 
necessarily sensitive to these strategic requirements, and therefore there is a need for 
more advanced analytical and planning tools. An example is constituted by the 
models introduced by Khan (1998, 2002, 2004a, b,c and 2008a,b,c) within the context 
of nonlinear positive feed back innovation systems or POLIS. These models are 
sensitive to many of the above-mentioned concerns, and can be used to chart 
strategically the market socialist course, as their internal logic is consistent with 
China's "walking-on-two-legs" catch up strategy. Actually, this strategy   aims at 
embodying world-class best practices from technological world leaders and successful 
late industrializers, but is also uniquely Chinese in at least two crucial aspects. The 
first is China's sheer size, which has allowed her to leapfrog to rank 2 worldwide in 
terms of the absolute quantitative magnitude of its NSI, at a stage when it still  lags far 
behind all technological leaders in terms of per capita educational, technological, and 
research  achievements. The second is China's peculiar, "socialistic" version of market 
socialism, which - along with many, mainly static inefficiencies - confers her leaders 
an outstanding advantage in the crucial area of strategic planning, i.e. the capability to 
master national resources and to earmark them towards key goals accordingly to a 
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APPENDIX  The investment decision-making process in capitalistic and 
socialistic economies 
In a "normal" capitalistic country each of the various capitalists forming the 
bourgeoisie must decide individually what to do with their respective share of surplus. 
This decision-making process essentially takes place in a rather uncoordinated, 
atomized fashion. Individual capitalists, using their limited information, try to 
maximize their respective welfare functions. The most important argument of such 
functions is capitalists' own present and future conspicuous consumption of (mostly 
luxury) goods and services. Capitalists' propensity to consume, in turn, is shaped by a 
risk- averse time-preference schedule characterized by a relatively high implicit rate 
of discount. Each capitalist ends up investing a share of (past) profits
34 that is 
positively correlated with the expected (risk-weighted) profit rate, setting aside a non-
zero, non negligible amount for his own present consumption.  
A major consequence of capitalists' decision-making process at the aggregate 
level of the national economy as a whole is that the reinvested share of surplus tends 
to be lower in capitalistic context than in a socialistic one, due mainly to two factors. 
First, capitalists' degree of preference for present consumption (which would 
presumably be lower or nil if the agent responsible for the investment decision where 
not a capital owner, and were not historically used to a certain level of conspicuous 
consumption). Second, individual capitalists can be expected to exhibit   a degree of 
risk aversion higher than that of a hypothetical public agent. The latter, in fact, should 
be endowed of superior information, and her subsistence consumption consumption - 
which, in any case, is lower than the capitalists conspicuous one. - should also be   
relatively shelved from the possible negative outcomes of a failed.  
A socialistic mechanism of investment decision-making, however, can lead to 
irresponsible overinvestment on the part of public agents, unless a proper system of 
incentives and risk balancing is put in place. Let us assume that there are three sets of 
feasible investment projects. The first set is constituted by those projects which are 
expected to generate a rate of profit high enough to be invested in by the bourgeoisie 
in capitalist society, along the lines sketched above.  These projects will be carried out 
also  in the "socialistic" society, with a degree of efficiency that might be higher, 
lower, or equal to the corresponding one that would prevail in a capitalist society
35 A 
second set is constituted by investment projects that are socially, but not privately 
profitable  - or better said, not profitable enough  to be  funded by capitalists. Some of 
them might even carry a negative rate of profit if evaluated individually according to 
the actually-existing structure of prices, due inter alia to well-known phenomena such 
as spillovers, imperfect capturability of benefits and externalities. Yet, they might in 
fact result socially profitable, and hence worth undertaking, if evaluated on the basis 
of shadow prices stemming from a long-term social welfare function maximization 
exercise. Investment projects belonging to the second set are bound to be carried out 
in a socialistic society, but not in a capitalistic one.  
Finally, a third set is constituted by bad projects, which have a negative social 
present value and would only represent a waste of resources. Of course, they should 
be discarded by both types of society, but they might have a relatively higher chance 
to be carried out in a socialistic one if the system of incentives and checks and  20 
balances for enterprise managers, economic ministries and local governments is 
excessively biased in favour of a blind expansion of the quantity of investment per se. 
The argument developed in this brief appendix has implicitly assumed a static 
closed economy scenario, with a given state of available techniques. In our view, 
these apparently restrictive assumptions do not seriously undermine the relevance of 
our comparative discussion on aggregate investment in China vis a vis India (or other 
semi-industrialized capitalist countries). In a dynamic scenario techniques change, 
and the speed and direction of technical progress become largely endogenous (mainly 
via the share of investment earmarked to R&D and S&T activities). Path-dependency 
and cumulative effects thereby tends to reinforce divergences in accumulation and 
technical change patterns over time. However, the fundamental difference in the 
mechanism of investment decisions between a capitalist and a socialistic country can 
be essentially captured also in a simplified static context.  With respect to the closed 
economy assumption, as is well known China's and India's economies are actually 
quite open and international trade plays a large and increasingly relevant role in both 
of them. However, they are also very large. As profitability conditions are (or at least 
are perceived to be by foreign investors) more favourable in China, this country 
receives much more FDI than India. This huge FDI flows contributes (but not in a 
decisive way, at least from a quantitative viewpoint) to increase China's investment 
rate with respect to India's. However, neither in China or in India FDI and 
international financial flows plays a crucial role in fuelling aggregate investment. The 
main engine of accumulation, both in China and India, is constituted by domestic 
savings and investments.   21   22 
Source: MINISTRY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA           
CHINA  SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY STATISTICS  DATA BOOK                   
http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/statistics/2007/200801/P020080109573867344872.pdf                
                           
TABLE 1  CHINA     R%D INPUT INDICATORS                     
                           
                           
TABLE 1.1  GERD  Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D                  
   2001          2002         2003         2004         2005         2006    2006           
                By source          
GERD (100 mn yuan)  1042.5         3003.1   Business    GOV           
                69.10%  24.70%          
GERD/GDP  0.95 1.07 1.13  1.23  1.33  1.42                 
                By sector           
                Business   
Research 
institutes       
                71.10%  18.90%          
                           
Source: MOST 2007                            
                           
                           
TABLE 1.2   R&D personnel by sector 2006                     
                           
Sector                            
Business   Research institutes  Higher education                     
65.7  15.4   16.1                        
                           
Type of activity                           
Basic R  Applied r   Experimental D                       
9 20  71                        
                           
Source: MOST 2007                            
                             23 
                           
TABLE 1.3  2006  High-technology industry expenditure on R&D and as a percentage of value added        
                            
                            
        R&D exp  100 mn yuan  % of value added             
                            
Total manufacturing    1551.4     2.14                
                            
High-tech industries          4.54               
  Aircraft  spacecraft          13.82               
  Computers office equipment        3.45                 
  Electronic&telecom  eq        5.41               
  Medical eq and meters        2.67                 
  Pharmaceuticals          2.91               
                            
                            
Source: MOST 2007                           
                              24 
 
                            
TABLE 1.4  Government S&T Appropriation                   
                            
      2001         2006          
                         
Government S&T Appropriation  100 mn y  703          1688             
                            
% in total gov exp      3.7          4.2             
                            
                            
Special  project  funds      359         780            
                            
operating  funds      223         483            
                            
                            
                            
S&T  personnel  10000   314         413            
                            
R&D personnel  10000 person-years  96          150             
                            
Scientists  &  engineers    74         122            
                            
                            
Source: MOST 2007                           
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TABLE 2  CHINA  R&D OUTPUT INDICATORS                     
                            
                            
TABLE 2.1.  Patents granted, 1996-2006 (10000)                   
                            
1996  2000  2003       2005             2006    
Total Total  Total       Total  Domestic  Foreign 
Domestic/Total 
(%)   Total    Domestic  Foreign 
Domestic
Total/% 
4.4 10.5  18.2        21.4 17.2  4.2  80.2      26.8 22.4 4.4 
      Invention    5.3  2.1  3.3  38.8      5.8  2.5  3.3 
      Utility  model  7.9  7.8 0.1  98.5     10.8  10.6  0.1 
      Design    8.1  7.3  0.9  89.5      10.3  9.2  1.0 
                            
           Domestic service invention patents, 2006    Business   9433  51.3%  
                    Research  institutes  2553  13.9%   
                    Higher  education 6198  33.7%   
Source: MOST 2007                           
                              26 
 
                            
TABLE 2.2    S&T papers                       
                            
Domestic S&T papers, 000s        Chinese papers indexed by SCI, EI, and ISTP, 000s        
                          
   2001 2006  Change  (%)        2001  2006  Change  (%)     
Total   203.2  404.9  99.2      Total        64.5  172  166.7       
Business    14.5  13.3  -8.2      Share of domestic S&T papers   31.7  42.5  33.9      
Research institutes  29.1  42.4  45.6                      
Higher education  132.6  243.5  83.6                       
Medical inst  19.7  91.3  362.5                       
                           
Source: MOST 2007                          
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TABLE 3  HIGH-TECH TRADE                        
                             
TABLE 3.1   CHINA  HIGH-TECH TRADE  1996-2006, USD 100 mn                
                           
      1996 2000 2001  2006                
                           
Exports      127  370  465  2814                 
   % in total exports       17.5  29                
   % in manufacturing exports     19.4  30.7                
                          
Imports      225  525  641  2473                 
   % in total importsexports     26.3  31.2                
   % in manufacturing imports     32.4  40.9                
                          
Trade balance HT     -98  -155  -176  341                 
                           
Source: MOST 2007                            
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TABLE 3.2.   HIGH-TECH TRADE  BY FIELD 2006, USD mn                
                           
    Exports  Imports  Trade balance                 
                           
Aircraft spacecraft    24.4  131.6  -107.2                     
Computers & telecom    2249.0  706.9  1542.1                     
Electronics   360.0  1301.9  -941.8                     
life science tech    63.4  51.4  12.0                     
Computer-integrated manuf  26.8  196.3  -169.5                     
                           
Source: MOST 2007                            
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TABLE 4  INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS                       
                           
TABLE 4.1.  R&D INPUTS                       
                           
GERD  Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D, 100 mn USD                   
                           
                           
      China   US  Japan   Germany  Korea Italy    Russia  Brazil  India      
Basic  R       5.2  18.7  13.3                
Applied Research       16.8  21.3  22.4                   
Experimental D      78  60  64.3                   
                           
Source: MOST 2007                            
                             30 
 
                           
TABLE 4.2.  Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D -- GERD (billion current PPP $)              
   1996  2000  2001  2005  2006  RANK                
Japan 83  99  104  123  129  3                  
United States  198  268  278  325  338  1                  
EU-15  139 176  188  223 233                   
China 19  45  52  113  136  2                  
Germany 41  52  53  61 63  4                  
                           
Growth rates:  average 1981-2006                      
Japan         4.5  2                 
United States        3.9  3                 
EU-15         4.8                  
China         20.4  1                 
Germany         3.5  4                  
                             
                             
Source: OECD 2006, Fig.1.                        
                              31 
 
                           
TABLE 4.3. R&D PERSONNEL                        
       China     Japan   Germany  Russia              
      2006   2005  2005  2005             
1000 person-years      1502.5    921.2  473.7  919.7               
R&D personnel per 10,000 labor force  19    139  115  124               
                         
Source: MOST 2007                            
                           
                           
TABLE 4.4.  R&D OUTPUTS                       
                           
      China   US  Japan   Germany Russia Korea  UK  Italy        
                           
Patents granted (domestic, 2005)  20705 74637  111088  13084  19447  53419  3751  na         
                           
S&T papers indexed (SCI, EI, ISTP)  171878 590807 148887  134557  41316 na  138678  78166        
   Rank    2  1  3  4  13  na  4  7         
   %    8.4  28.8  7.2  6.6  2.01  na  6.8  3.8         
S&T papers indexed (SCI)   71184  378690  88486  88850  23033  na  97942  50546         
   Rank    5  1  2  3  14  na  2  8         
   %    5.9  31.2  7.3  7.3  1.9  na  8.1  4.2         
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1 The elaboration of a more thorough and formal assessment, designed also to be further developed as a 
practically usable policy tool,  will be the ultimate object of a larger research project, of which the 
present paper is to be seen as an introductory  and propedeutic working document.  
2 Gabriele (2002) is based on  Chinese and foreign sources of the mid- and late 1990s. 
3 In the remainder of the paper it will be showed that at present, less than about a decade later, such a 
resources reorientation is actually taking  place, and China's R&D sector has probably reached  a 
critical mass. The crucial issues, therefore, are becoming more and more of a qualitative, rather than a 
quantitative, nature.  
4  If Korea and Taiwan are considered as already developed, it is not obvious that any developing 
country, apart from China, is really closing the technological gap.. Emerging industrial and 
technological powers such as India and Brazil, for instance, are very far from engaging in a sustained 
R&D effort comparable to China's.   
5 It has been argued such a  peculiar societal and institutional environment is conducive to a rather high 
level of corruption. However, as it co-exists with a high  level of public trust, such a corruption is 
relatively ""efficiency-enhancing" rather than purely predatory (Li 2007). On the concept of ambiguous 
property rights see Gabriele 1993. 
6 See below, sections 2 and 4 2.2. 
7 Chinese industrial conglomerates' strong capitalization   was due to some extent to the high valuation 
of the Shanghai stock market in 2007. 
8 According to Suh (2008), this alarming trend among US companies  is due mainly to two factors. One 
is  to a structural phenomenon favouring followers over technological leaders: the former have nothing 
to lose in  earmarking  most of their new investment towards the newest technologies, while the latter 
tend to channel most of their fresh capital  to fortifying old technological systems. The second factor, 
related to the former but qualitatively different, is a subjective (and possibly conjunctural) increase in  
risk aversion among American top executives. However, it is also conceivable that increasing risk 
aversion might be at least partly a rational response of very well-informed informed agents  to a real 
economy-wide increase in the riskiness of investment in the US. One major culprit is the long-term 
impact of the mess caused by deregulation excesses in the US financial system. In this respect, Suh 
observes that "US companies may be spending more but they are not spending better. Spending on the 
Sarbanes-Oxley compliance law and mergers and acquisitions integration is consuming most 
discretionary capital. This has delayed crucial new projects and left old systems to sup- port ageing 
processes". Another factor is probably constituted by unfavourable  geopolitical trends, which  are 
leading towards  a deterioration of US control on energy and other primary resources worldwide..  
 
9 The vast majority of China's exports is constituted by   manufactures.  
10 As is well known, PPP estimates are tentative, and should not be read straight-forwardly as the "true" 
figures  as opposed to the "wrong" one expressed in current USD. By their very nature,  PPP estimates ( 
specularly to ordinary data expressed in current USD)   relatively overestimate to some extent poorer 
countries' GDP and other economic magnitudes with respect to richer ones, mainly because they tend to 
underestimate the  weight of traded goods. For instance, a country's ability to obtain advanced weapons 
is better approximated by its GDP in current USD than by its GDP in PPP terms. This bias might be 
particularly  relevant  in the case of R&D. for instance,  an average engineer's salary in current USD is 
much lower in China than in the US or Japan. However, it is  possible (albeit not at all certain) that a 
Chinese engineer's   "true" skills are lower than those of her/his American counterparts, to an extent 
that, in practice, cannot be gauged in a precise manner. If this were the case, China's R&D expenditure  
in PPP would end up being overestimated relatively to that of the US and Japan.  
11 2006 figures  are projections.. 
12 Different countries' synthetic indicators of international R&D outputs, even more so than R&D input 
indicators, are not always fully comparable and/or less than straightforward to interpreter properly. For 
instance, country A might publish more indexed R&D papers than country B, yet the quality  of 
country B's papers' might be higher. The latter information is not carried out by the parsimonious 
indicator "number of indexed R&D papers".  
13The productivity of capital is  the inverse of the capital/output ratio.    41 
                                                                                                                         
14 India's capital productivity surpasssed China's in the early 1990s, and by the early 2000s it was about 
30% higher (see Felipe et al 2008, figure 8). 
15 The World Bank report also observes that "… if 50 percent of SOE profits, estimated at 6.5 percent 
of GDP in 2004, were distributed to the budget, this would support an 85 percent increase in 
government spending on education and health" (Kuijs , Mako , and Zhang C., 2005, p.7.) 
16 Li Rongrong, director of the state-asset regulator body in 2006 that the dividends from SOEs would  
likely be used to fund public works projects and support the development of select industries (Shanghai 
Daily 2007 September 14, 2007).  
17 Two caveats are warranted.. The first is that, in our view, neither extreme model system could 
practically exist, let alone prosper, in the real world, so that - at least, during the present historical time 
- only intermediate, hybrid socioeconomic formation can be sustainable, even if crucial differences 
among the more "socialistic" and the more "capitalistic" ones do exist.  Second, the term "socialistic", 
even if its genesis is related to a mental experiment, is meant to be an analytical tool referring 
exclusively to the scientific, positive observation of objective features of really existing socioeconomic 
systems. On the contrary, per se, it does not imply any value judgement on whether one or another 
socioeconomic system is performing more satisfactorily than the others ( or might be  better equipped 
to do so in the future) in the realm of achieving the normative goals  traditionally pursued by the 
socialist movement (such as  universal satisfaction of basic needs,  social justice, and an end of  
workers'  exploitation). 
 
18 This remains true even taking into account phenomena such as widespread corruption and the 
conspicuous consumption of a newborn "new rich" class in China, as the latter lacks some of the 
typical crucial social and political  attributes  of a ruling capitalist class. This statement constitutes an 
informed, yet heuristic judgement based on the interpretation of  available historical, sociological, 
political, and economic evidence. By its own nature, it cannot constitute a  scientifically proven 
proposition, and we are aware that many observers legitimately disagree with us on this important 
point.  
19 The other member is, of course, Vietnam. 
20 As explained above, "the term "socialistic" does not imply any  value judgement in  teleological, 
normative terms. 
21 The public sector holds a commanding leadership position in  controlling China's overall investment 
process, not only in quantitative, but also in qualitative terms. In this respect, one  often underestimated 
reason explaining the higher profitability of China's) private enterprises vis a vis SOEs is that the latter  
have been according a  significant priority on   infrastructure, R&D and investment in advanced 
sectors, thereby  also creating  major positive externalities. Conversely,  the investment of domestic 
capitalists (and, to some extent, of TVEs) is  in a certain sense of a residual nature, as it concentrates on 
reaping the ample money-making opportunities in traditional sectors, where a relatively small 
investment can generate high profits in the short term. 
22 If, more realistically, we were assuming that workers also save  a share of their income, the story 
would not differ  substantially, as  the capitalist class is the only one which  has the power to decide 
about the allocation of the surplus (see Pasinetti 1962). 
23 Capitalists as a class might end up overinvesting under particular circumstances due to factors such 
as asymmetric information , irrational exuberance, herd behaviour, financial and real estate bubbles, 
etc., leading to crises. 
24 Of course, this rather strong statement implicitly assumes a ceteris paribus condition with respects to 
the efficiency of investment. 
25 For the sake of our argument, it is sufficient to assume that the  share of profits which is reinvested is 
significantly higher than in a "normal" capitalist country. In practice,  of course, a sizeable share of 
China's  profits is earned by TNCs and national capitalists. According to our interpretative approach, 
there is no reason to believe that their investment behaviour should be much different from that of 
capitalists operating in any other country. However, it is possible that some aspects of Chinese national 
culture could be conducive to a relatively high propensity to save and invest on the part of China's 
capitalists. 
26 Of course, if - as it is the case in China - the marginal productivity of investment is not only lower 
than, for instance, in India, but also progressively declining, the existing pattern of growth is not   42 
                                                                                                                         
sustainable in the long run. It is therefore necessary to  put a brake to the  excessive   rise in the rate of 
accumulation and - more importantly - accelerate the rate of genuine technical progress and shift its 
bias  away from the ultimately unsustainable Marxian one, which is  labor-saving but capital- 
consuming. 
27 This is the virtuous case where all, or most, of the additional investment (with respect to that which 
would prevail in a capitalist setting) is earmarked towards the privately unprofitable but of socially 
useful projects. The opposite, of course, is true if, on the contrary, most of the additional investment 
goes towards bad projects of the third type.  
 
28 There are a few examples of  capitalists countries  planned countries which  reached accumulation 
rates  similar  to that of China. However, they were strongly atypical, due to the depth and effectiveness 
of government intervention in the economy. Classical examples are   Singapore and Korea.  
29 An example would be to earmark more resources to all levels of education, in order to increase the 
supply  of skilled labour and highly-skilled labor via human capital formation. Besides boosting 
technical progress and economic development, such a policy would help to  lower the skilled/unskilled 
wage premium, thereby diminishing wage inequality in a  market-compatible fashion. 
30 The  United States Information Technology Office in Beijing translated the Chinese  term used in the 
Plan  as  “independent, self-reliant, and indigenous” and "combining three distinct elements: yuanshi 
(original, or genuinely new); jicheng (integrated, or combining existing technologies in new ways); and 
yinjin (assimilated, or making improvements to imported technologies)". (AeA 2007). 
31 Thus,   "the United States and other global powers should not underestimate China's ability to follow 
through on them and become an economic and technological equal." (AeA 2007) 
 
32 On energy and sustainability in China's development strategy see Khan (2008c,1997) 
33 As shown in section 3, China has being climbing the international ranking ladder in all categories of 
patents, but the relative weight of invention patents is still  comparatively low.  
34  Besides using his own  retained profits,  each  capitalist can have access  to part of the society's  
existing profits (i.e. potentially investible surplus) through the credit mechanisms. Ex post, however, 
for the economy as a whole, the mass of profits (surplus ) does not change. 
35 According to our approach, there is no a priori reason to believe that the efficiency with which 
"capitalistically profitable" investments is carried out should be lower in a socialistic society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 